Labor & Employment Blog

On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services that Title VII plaintiffs who belong to majority-groups—such as white or heterosexual employees—are not subject to heightened evidentiary requirements when bringing discrimination claims. For decades, several federal circuit courts applied a “background circumstances” test that required majority-group plaintiffs to present additional evidence beyond the standard McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment, creating a higher bar for so-called reverse discrimination claims. The Supreme Court rejected this approach, holding all Title VII plaintiffs, regardless of their membership in a majority or minority-group, must meet the same evidentiary standard when establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. The Ames decision eliminates the patchwork of inconsistent standards that had developed across federal circuits and ensures uniform application of Title VII’s anti-discrimination protections.

Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for Ohio’s juvenile correctional system since 2004, first as an executive secretary and later as a program administrator. In 2019, she applied for a promotion but was rejected in favor of a lesbian co-worker. Ames’s supervisor was gay, and the supervisor suggested Ames retire. A few days after that suggestion, the employer relieved Ames from her administrator position but offered her a demotion (resulting in a significant pay cut) to return to her original, secretarial role. A gay man filled Ames’s administrator position.  

Ames sued her employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting a claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation (heterosexual). The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and dismissed Ames’s discrimination claim. The district court applied circuit precedent which required Ames to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory motive by presenting evidence of “background circumstances” that her employer was an unusual employer who discriminates against members of a majority-group. Ames did not present evidence of the relevant minority group making the employment decision or statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ames’s claims.

The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split among circuits as to whether Title VII majority-group plaintiffs should be subject to a higher evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs when trying to establish the first step in the McDonnell Douglas test, i.e. creating an inference or presumption of discriminatory intent. Justice Jackson wrote for the unanimous court, rejecting the rule that required certain Title VII plaintiffs to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to carry their burden under the first step of the test.

Textually, Title VII does not distinguish between majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs. Instead, the statute makes it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or discharge “any individual” or otherwise discriminate against “any individual” because of the individual’s protected trait. “Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone,” the Court wrote. The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule for majority-group plaintiffs “flouts t[he] basic principle” that the standard by which a Title VII proves unlawful disparate treatment does not change based upon whether the employee is a member of a majority-group. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ rulings and remanded Ames’s case back to the district court to apply the correct prima facie standard.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote separately to concur in the judgment. But he went even further. Justice Thomas agreed the “background circumstances” test some circuits used was “atextual” and lacked any basis in Title VII’s protections. He found the test to be a product of “improper judicial lawmaking,” but then he set his sights on the McDonnell Douglas test in general—another “judge-made rule” whose “framework has no basis in the text of Title VII.” Critical of the McDonnell Douglas test, Justice Thomas expressed his doubt that the test is suitable for evaluating Title VII claims at the summary judgment stage. Not only did Justice Thomas indicate he would consider, when the issue was squarely before the Court, whether the McDonnell Douglas test should be used for that purpose, but he prompted litigants and courts to resolve Title VII cases without using the test, stating the Supreme Court “has never required anyone to use it.”

Justice Thomas’s opinions about the ongoing viability of the McDonnell Douglas test echo the criticism two Texas Supreme Court Justices wrote last year in concurrences involving an age discrimination and retaliation claim filed under state law. In Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center—El Paso v. Flores, Justice Blacklock expressed his opinion that the Texas Labor Code contains no statutory text to support use of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. He was critical of the test “essentially revers[ing] the burden of proof” by “relax[ing] evidentiary standards based on ‘inferences’ and pretexts.’” Justice Blacklock raised concern about the test allowing a plaintiff to prove unlawful discrimination by showing the defendant did not “convincingly disclaim discrimination.” Justice Young joined Justice Blacklock’s concurrence and, similar to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Ames, encouraged parties in future cases to raise the issue of the ongoing applicability of the McDonnell Douglas test under Texas jurisprudence.    

The Ames decision reinforces Title VII’s protection of all employees, regardless of their protected traits or their status as a member of a majority- or minority-group. Courts must apply the same legal standards and impose evidentiary burdens on parties similarly. However, amid a nationwide discussion about diversity, equity, and inclusion, the Ames decision may assist reverse-discrimination cases and challenges to employers’ DEI policies.

While not every circuit applied the “background circumstances” test, all employers are encouraged to take proactive steps to mitigate risk and reinforce compliance with federal and state anti-discrimination laws. To stay ahead of compliance issues, employers should continue monitoring developments in employment law and conduct periodic policy reviews with their legal counsel.

Chamberlain Hrdlicka’s Labor & Employment Group is available to answer any questions and assist in helping you navigate this broadened scope of employer liability under Title VII. If you have questions about how this ruling affects your business or want to conduct a proactive review of your employment policies, please contact our labor and employment team.

Read the full Ames opinion here: Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services