In cybersecurity, the gap between a reasonable response and a costly one is often measured not in what happened, but in how prepared you were before it did. Attacks that once required significant time and expertise can now be launched faster, tailored more convincingly, and deployed more broadly. As a result, breach response, litigation risk, and regulatory scrutiny have become tightly intertwined, with organizations increasingly judged on whether they acted reasonably and quickly when an incident occurred.
AI is now firmly established as both a threat vector and a defensive tool. On the threat side, AI enhances traditional cyber tactics such as phishing, social engineering, and credential harvesting by increasing speed, personalization, and volume. Attribution has become more difficult, as it can be challenging to determine which model was used, who owns it, or whether the activity involved off‑the‑shelf tools or internal systems. At the same time, new foundational and agentic AI models introduce novel risks, particularly when they integrate directly with enterprise systems or APIs. While AI can strengthen detection and response capabilities, its use must be carefully governed, monitored, and documented. Organizations are expected to map where AI is used across the enterprise and tightly control open‑source or third‑party AI tools.
Incident response in this environment demands early, coordinated decision‑making. Teams must assess the attack vector, determine whether AI played a role, and identify whether a provider can be contacted, or assistance sought. Incident response plans should explicitly address AI, including its use during investigations and in communications. Unified messaging, especially in initial customer notifications, is critical, as early statements often shape litigation and regulatory outcomes. Close alignment among legal, security, and technical teams from the outset can significantly reduce downstream risk.
Law enforcement engagement can also play a valuable role during cyber incidents, particularly in ransomware cases. Authorities typically seek targeted technical information rather than sensitive company data and can offer operational support, threat intelligence, and, in some cases, recovery assistance. Importantly, cooperation with law enforcement is distinct from regulatory disclosure obligations and is often viewed favorably by regulators.
Finally, organizations must remain alert to third‑party, insider, and transactional risks. Cyber vulnerabilities are frequently inherited through vendors, mergers, and acquisitions, making due diligence and ongoing monitoring essential.
What has changed most dramatically is the pace. AI has compressed the window between emerging threat and real-world exploitation to a degree that reactive planning is no longer sufficient. Organizations cannot afford to wait for a breach to pressure-test their incident response plans, governance structures, and legal strategies.
- Associate
Michael Henn is an associate in the Intellectual Property practice. Michael’s experience in patent prosecution includes patent drafting, responding to U.S, office actions, managing patent prosecution in foreign patent ...



